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Louboutin’s Red Sole Mark: A Step toward Tertiary Meaning
“[F]ashion is the fashion.”1
I. Introduction
Louis Armstrong’s wonderful world contains “trees of green . . . red roses, too.”2 The
wonderful world of trademark law contains its own rainbow—a rainbow of attributed colors3—
and that rainbow just got one red wider, if certain conditions are met: In September, the Second
Circuit upheld Christian Louboutin’s trademark protection for the red-lacquered soles4 that make
J-Lo sing,5 that have popularized red paint,6 and that constitute the totemic center of the shoebased religion he preaches.7 To the extent that the soles’ redness contrasts with the rest of the
shoe, the soles have secondary meaning—“these are Louboutins”—and are thus protectable.8

1

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING act 3, sc. 3.
LOUIS ARMSTRONG, WHAT A WONDERFUL WORLD (ABC Records 1967).
3
To name but a few examples: Tiffany blue, UPS Brown, Owens-Corning Pink. See Ashby Jones, The Red-Sole
Case, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203718504577181360914355808.html; see also infra app. at
Figure 1.
4
See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012).
5
JENNIFER LOPEZ, LOUBOUTINS (Epic 2009). Apparently, Louboutin is a fan of the song—and of the fact that
Lopez pronounced his name correctly. See Sarah Karmali, Christian Louboutin loves J-Lo's new single...
Louboutins!, MARIE CLAIRE (Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.marieclaire.co.uk/news/fashion/433382/christian-louboutinloves-j-lo-s-new-single-louboutins.html#beGotDKEtbWeDtSe.99.
6
Cash-strapped Women are Painting Their Shoe Soles Red to Get the Louboutin Look for Less, TELEGRAPH (July
10, 2012), http://fashion.telegraph.co.uk/news-features/TMG9389255/Cash-strapped-women-are-painting-theirshoe-soles-red-to-get-the-Louboutin-look-for-less.html.
7
Louboutin has been outspoken about the significance of the shoes he creates. Some highlights include the notions
that “comfy” is a dirty word (“I hate the whole concept of comfort! You’re abandoning a lot of ideas when you are
too into comfort. ‘Comfy’—that’s one of the worst words! I just picture a woman feeling bad, with a big bottle of
alcohol, really puffy.”); that men can’t resist women who wear his shoes (“‘Men are like bulls,’ Louboutin said.
‘They cannot resist the red sole.’”); that “shoes are like books, or workouts: if they doesn’t demand anything of you,
you’re not going to get a lot out of them;” that feet are “lucky” (“‘The foot has this lucky thing. . . . A lot of women
don’t like when they’re sort of fat, but a fat foot is as beautiful as a skinny foot. Think of Greek statues. Look how
many people love the foot of the baby! There is something super-charming about the baby foot.”); that shoes should
mold the body, not vice-versa (“His best shoes are almost prosthetic, morphing the body—lengthening the legs,
defining the calves, lifting the butt—as radically as it is possible to do without surgery. ‘One thing I detest . . . is
[1]
2

So what’s so special about the conditional proprietization of yet another hue? In granting
Louboutin dominion over the red sole, the Second Circuit underlined the “industry” in the
fashion industry. Rejecting the district court’s condemnation of Louboutin’s attempt to rob other
designer-artists of the ability to express themselves and compete with his products through red,9
the Second Circuit determined that shoes as a useful product whose functionality is not
necessarily enhanced through sole color. Louboutin’s red soles, the circuit held, serve to refer to
Louboutin himself, regardless of whatever primary, artistic meaning they contain.10
This case note argues that by holding that the red soles’ secondary meaning trumps their
primary meaning, the Second Circuit created space for the soles to take on tertiary meaning. The
act of contrast that the Second Circuit wrote into the very definition of the red sole mark can now
be reintegrated into the pool of possibilities other designers may use—we can imagine, for
example, mugs with red bases, nails with red undersides, cupcakes with red centers.11 Shoes
with soles of other contrasting colors have already been suggested to Louboutin12 and made

when a shoe is too soft, . . . molding to the foot,’ Louboutin said. ‘This is quite disgusting.’”); that high heels help
you appreciate scenery:
Louboutin . . . is not sympathetic to complaints about the deleterious effects of
high heels on locomotion. He told me a story about a client who, having bought
her first pair of his heels, was forced to slacken the pace of her morning walk.
“She began to notice the little details of her neighborhood for the first time,” he
said, proudly.
Lauren Collins, Sole Mate: Christian Louboutin and the psychology of shoes, NEW YORKER, Mar. 28, 2011,
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/03/28/110328fa_fact_collins?currentPage=all. To see how these ideas
are made manifest in Louboutin’s shoes, see infra app. at Figure 2.
8
Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 228.
9
See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 778 F. Supp.2d 445, 454–55 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
10
See Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 225–27.
11
The manicure and cupcake already exist; see infra app. at
Figure 3.
12
See Collins, supra note 7 (“The one thing Louboutin does not tweak is the color of the sole, even though charities
are always hounding him to do a pink one for National Breast Cancer Awareness Month, or a green one for Earth
Day. Shawna Rose [(famed publicist and Louboutin’s director of communications for the Americas)] told me, ‘I
don’t even torture him with it anymore.’”).
[2]

reality by others.13 Thanks to the careful framing of the Second Circuit, the contrasting bottom
has become quotable, which increases its Benthamian utility14 and fosters Aristotelian human
flourishing,15 while still respecting the maker’s rights of Lockean theory16 and the Hegelian
emphasis on personhood.17 In other words, the decision is a fashion-forward compromise
between the competing concerns that underlie intellectual property (“IP”) protections.
Part II of this note fills in the background against which the Second Circuit decided the
fate of the red soles, first by detailing some of the peculiarities of the fashion industry that have
made it a difficult match for IP law and then by setting forth the legal background of the singlecolor trademark. Part III explores the Louboutin case itself, concentrating on the different
approaches of the district and circuit courts and the significance of these differences. Part IV
explores the potential created by the Second Circuit’s decision and argues that trademark
protection in fashion can, as it does in this case, encourage cultural production rather than curb it.
II. Background
A. The Fashion Industry & the Law
Graphic designer and blogger Dyske Suematsu has observed that, “[a]lthough the skills
required to create the work are quite similar, the internal processes of so-called ‘fine arts’ and
‘commercial arts’ are fundamentally different. . . . What drives most fine artists is their urge to
say something[;] what drives most commercial artists is their urge to be heard.”18 Suematsu

13

See ROSSO SOLINI: DESIGNER SOLES, http://www.rossosolinishop.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2013) (selling stickon soles in a variety of colors and prints).
14
See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 11–19
(2012).
15
See id. at 200–03.
16
See id. at 191–97.
17
See id. at 197–99.
18
Dyske Suematsu, What Makes Art “Fine” or “Commercial”?, DYSKE: CULTURAL CRITIQUE (Aug. 7, 2010)
http://dyske.com/paper/933 (emphasis in original).
[3]

suggests that this distinction sets unfiltered self-expression at one pole and reception-driven
production at the other, with most art falling somewhere along the spectrum between the poles.19
Fashion is a prime example of the need for artistic compromise in light of the practical
concerns of a commercial world. Even schools that require uniforms have had to acknowledge
fashion as a prized means of self-expression;20 the Metropolitan Museum’s Costume Institute
showcases “five continents and seven centuries of fashionable dress.”21 Artistry is not enough,
however—as any fan of Project Runway knows, if you fail as a designer to strike a successful
balance between artistry and salability, “you’re out.”22 Indeed, “Fashion = Art + Commerce.”23
The commercial aspect of fashion distinguishes it from—and, to some, may make it
“lesser” than—a fine art, where beauty need not bow to functionality, where expression remains
unfettered, and where the final form of the artistic product is determined by the artist, not by
differences among human figures or by the vagaries of the wearers’ accessory choices.24 At the

19

See id.
See Stephanie Clifford, A Little Give in the Dress Code, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/business/school-dress-codes-letting-a-little-style-slipin.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
21
THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, http://www.metmuseum.org/about-the-museum/museumdepartments/curatorial-departments/the-costume-institute (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
22
“You’re out” is the catchphrase with which host Heidi Klum dismisses eliminated contestants each week. Project
Runway (Bravo 2004–08; Lifetime Television, 2009–present). As an example of the show’s frequent discussions of
the need to balance creativity with retail potential, series judge Michael Kors told one contestant who had strayed
too much toward the experimental, “I understand a non-traditional wedding. But I don’t care if you’re getting
married in Winesberg in a loft, you’re not wearing that.” Louis Virtel, Happy Birthday, Michael Kors! Here are His
9 Best ‘Project Runway’ Putdowns, AFTERELTON, (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.afterelton.com/people/2012/08/9best-michael-kors-project-runway-jokes?page=1,1 (quoting Project Runway: “Model” Clients (Bravo television
broadcast Jan. 12, 2005)).
23
This was the title of the 2012 symposium presented by Fordham University School of Law’s Fashion Law
Institute. See FASHION LAW INSTITUTE, http://fashionlawinstitute.com/institute-events/fashion-art-commerce, (last
visited Mar. 3, 2013); see also Joy Sewing, “Project Runway” Judge Zac Posen Talks Fashion, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec.
30, 2012), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/article/Project-Runway-judge-Zac-Posen-talks-fashion4150043.php (presenting comments by the designer on fashion as an industry as well as a creative process).
24
Kant, for example, in creating a hierarchy of the beautiful arts—a hierarchy that did not include fashion design —
prized forms that allow the communication of the artist’s idea(s) along with sensations of pleasure. See IMMANUEL
KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, part I, § 52, 214 (J. H. Bernard trans., 2d ed. 1914), available at
http://files.libertyfund.org/files/1217/0318_Bk.pdf (“[I]n all beautiful art the essential thing is the form, which is
purposive as regards our observation and [judgment], where the pleasure is at the same time cultivation and disposes
the spirit to Ideas, and consequently makes it susceptible of still more pleasure and entertainment.”). Interestingly,
[4]
20

same time, however, fashion’s commercial aspect is a source of credibility and cultural
prominence—should a skeptic deride fashion choices as frivolous like Anne Hathaway’s
character in The Devil Wears Prada, Meryl Streep’s Miranda Priestly has a compelling retort:
You go to your closet and you select... I don’t know... that lumpy
blue sweater, for instance because you’re trying to tell the world
that you take yourself too seriously to care about what you put on
your back. But what you don’t know is that that sweater is not just
blue, it’s not turquoise. It’s not lapis. It’s actually cerulean. And
you’re also blithely unaware of the fact that, in 2002, Oscar de la
Renta did a collection of cerulean gowns. And then I think it was
Yves Saint Laurent... wasn’t it who showed cerulean military
jackets? . . . And then cerulean quickly showed up in the
collections of eight different designers. And then it . . . filtered
down through the department stores and then trickled on down into
some tragic Casual Corner where you, no doubt, fished it out of
some clearance bin. However, that blue represents millions of
dollars and countless jobs and it’s sort of comical how you think
that you’ve made a choice that exempts you from the fashion
industry when, in fact, you’re wearing the sweater that was
selected for you by the people in this room from a pile of stuff.25
It is difficult to disagree with this logic—fashion is a $350 billion-a-year industry,26 with “annual
U.S. sales of more than $200 billion—larger than those of books, movies, and music
Kant does include “the art of tasteful dressing (with rings, snuff-boxes, etc.)” as an analog to painting in his
taxonomy of the arts, another indication that the final disposition is key. Id. at part I, § 51, 211.
Susan Scafidi has noted—and condemned—a similarly dismissive attitude toward fashion among lawyers:
Two dress forms grace the entrance of Fordham University Law professor Susan
Scafidi’s new ground-floor office. One is hugged by a lavender RM by Roland
Mouret moon dress, and the other wears a pink knockoff by the—perhaps
ironically named—label Rare. “It’s no accident that I put pink dresses on there,”
Scafidi says, gesturing to the dress forms. “Fashion is a pink-and-lavender
discipline. It’s associated with women and gay men, and there is an ongoing
perception that this is a lighthearted subject. It can be, but the legal issues are
every bit as complicated and hard to crack as in any other field.”
Shakthi Jothianandan, Fordham’s New Fashion Law Institute Will Serve, Protect, Talk Shoes, THE CUT (Aug. 11,
2010, 2:10 PM), http://nymag.com/thecut/2010/08/fashion_law_institute.html; see also C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie
Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1150 (2009) (noting that the law treats
fashion design as different from literature, music, and art).
25
Memorable quotes for The Devil Wears Prada, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0458352/quotes (last visited
Mar. 3, 2013) (quoting THE DEVIL WEARS PRADA (Twentieth Century Fox 2006)).
26
Lynsey Blackmon, Comment, The Devil Wears Prado: A Look at the Design Piracy Prohibition Act and the
Extension of Copyright Protection to the World of Fashion, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 107, 11 (2007) (citing Design Piracy
Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Jeffrey Banks, a fashion designer)).
[5]

combined.”27 Indeed, “fashion is an industry of major economic, environmental and cultural
significance [that has] been significant to the industrial and economic development of a number
of countries . . . [and] has also played a significant role in the global relations between nations.”28
Despite the fashion industry’s financial and social importance, however, fashion design
has largely fallen by the legal wayside in the United States.29 Scholars and industry insiders are
starting to call attention to this neglect—and to call for a change: Fordham’s Fashion Law
Institute, directed by Professor Susan Scafidi, opened its doors in late 2010;30 The New York
City Bar’s new Fashion Committee was created in 2011;31 the new and improved iteration of
fashion-friendly legislation originally penned in 2006 began to make the Congressional rounds in
2012.32 If passed, this legislation will come over eighty years after Learned Hand presaged its
necessity, when he announced that no law protected designers:
It seems a lame answer in such a case to turn the injured party out
of court . . . . Congress might see its way to create some sort of
temporary right, or it might not. Its decision would certainly be
preceded by some examination of the result upon the other
27

Hemphill & Suk, supra note 24, at 1148.
JOANNE ENTWISTLE, THE FASHIONED BODY: FASHION, DRESS AND MODERN SOCIAL THEORY 208 (2000)
(emphasis in the original).
29
See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 24, at 1150.
30
See Jothianandan, supra note 24
(Scafidi is the director of Fordham University’s new Fashion Law Institute, the
first of its kind, which officially launches September 8. The Institute, supported
in part by the Council of Fashion Designers of America, will be the primary
nerve center for the academic study of fashion-related legal issues; it'll also offer
pro bono legal counseling to designers in need. “Fashion law is a new academic
field and it’s new to even call it ‘fashion law,’ never mind to even conceive of it
as a whole,” says Scafidi.)
31
See City Bar Creates New Committee on Fashion Law, NEW YORK CITY BAR (Jan 10., 2011, 2:09 PM),
http://www.nycbar.org/component/wordpress/2011/01/10/city-bar-creates-new-committee-on-fashionlaw/?option=com_wordpress&Itemid=299 (“The New York City Bar Association has announced the creation of a
new committee on Fashion Law, which will study and comment on a wide range of legal issues associated with the
fashion industry.”).
32
See Susan Scafidi, Fashion PROTECTION Week: New "fashion copyright" bill (IDPA); red sole relief; and a new
design manifesto, COUNTERFEIT CHIC (Sept. 10, 2012), http://counterfeitchic.com/2012/09/fashion-protection-weeknew-fashion-copyright-bill-idpa-red-sole-relief-and-a-new-design-manifesto.html (“In the U.S. Congress today,
Senator Chuck Schumer introduced the newest version of the fashion design protection legislation originally
proposed in 2006 and currently pending in the House of Representatives. . . . Happily the title isn’t such a mouthful
this time; the IDPPPA is now simply the IDPA, the “Innovative Design Protection Act.”).
[6]
28

interests affected. Whether these would prove paramount we have
no means of saying; it is not for us to decide.33
It is surprising that an industry of such economic prominence has only recently begun to
garner concerted legal attention. It is even more surprising that fashion in particular has lacked
protection when it seems so fundamentally akin to IP. As Barton Beebe has noted,
Sumptuary law[34] did not disappear with industrialization and
democratization, as is generally believed. Rather, it has taken on a
new . . . form: intellectual property law. To be sure, the express
purpose and primary effect of intellectual property law remains the
prevention of misappropriation and the promotion of technological
and cultural progress. But for various reasons, we are increasingly
investing intellectual property law with, and forcing the law to
adapt to, a new purpose. This purpose is to preserve and stabilize
our modern sumptuary code in the face of emerging social and
technological conditions that threaten its viability . . . . We are thus
increasingly relying on intellectual property law not so much to
enforce social hierarchy as simply to conserve . . . our system of
consumption-based social distinction and the social structures and
norms based upon it.35
If IP is the modern means of protecting consumption-derived status, it should be fashion’s soul
mate—after all, “apparel oft proclaims the man,”36 and “fashions are not distinctive because they
are beautiful; they are beautiful because they are distinctive.”37 Seeming harmony of purpose
notwithstanding, fashion does not enjoy easy access to intellectual property protection.
“The term ‘intellectual property,’ conventionally understood, includes, on a federal level,
utility and design patents and copyrights, on a federal and state level, trademark and trade dress
protection.”38 The United States Copyright Office distinguishes among the three as follows:

33

Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 281 (2d Cir. 1929).
“A statute, ordinance, or regulation that limits the expenditures that people can make for personal gratification or
ostentatious display.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1574 (9th ed. 2009).
35
Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 813–14 (2010).
36
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 3.
37
Beebe, supra note 35, at 865–66.
38
Charles E. Colman, An Overview of Intellectual Property Issues Relevant to the Fashion Industry, in NAVIGATING
FASHION LAW: LEADING LAWYERS ON EXPLORING THE TRENDS, CASES, AND STRATEGIES OF FASHION LAW
(Aspatore 2012), 2012 WL 167352 at *1, 1. Colman also notes that there are several forms of state-level protection
for intellectual property, such as “trade secret protection, the right of publicity, the right against misappropriation,
[7]
34

Copyright protects original works of authorship, while a patent
protects inventions or discoveries. Ideas and discoveries are not
protected by the copyright law, although the way in which they are
expressed may be. A trademark protects words, phrases, symbols,
or designs identifying the source of the goods or services of one
party and distinguishing them from those of others.39
Fashion arguably encompasses inventions (the zipper, for example), original works (such as a
design, like that of the foldable Longchamp bags) and trademarks (e.g. embroidered alligator
logos). All three main varieties of legal protection for intellectual property could thus protect
fashion designers, at least in theory. In practice, because of the idiosyncrasies of the fashion
industry, none of these three has provided the designs that deck the runways and drive the
industry the legal protection that many feel they both deserve and require.40
and other causes of action that vary by state.” Id. These peripheral protections, however, vary greatly and do not
offer much protection to fashion designs. see id. at *56–57.
39
COPYRIGHT, http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-general.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). But see Wendy J.
Gordon, Intellectual Property, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 617–46 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet
eds., 2003) (suggesting that the demarcations among these three protections are not quite so tidy and that there is
potential for slippage among them).
40
Not all scholars believe that protecting fashion designs through intellectual property law is desirable. First, there
are those who resist intellectual property protections in general, or who would at least seek to limit them. See, e.g.,
GNU OPERATING SYSTEM, http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) (“Proprietary software
developers use copyright to take away the users’ freedom; we use copyright to guarantee their freedom. That’s why
we reverse the name, changing ‘copyright’ into ‘copyleft.’”); Carrie McLaren, Copyrights and Copywrongs: An
Interview with Siva Vaidhyanathan, STAY FREE! (Fall 2002) http://www.stayfreemagazine.org/archives/index.html
(presenting interviewee’s distinction between intellectual “property,” which he defines as a “government-granted
monopoly” from real property and noting that “copyright is not natural, it’s something that we the people decided to
give to a certain class of people in exchange for something”); Martin Skladany, Alienation by Copyright:
Abolishing Copyright to Spur Individual Creativity, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 361, 392 (2008) (“The death of
copyright would hopefully dampen the over-consumption of commercial art and encourage people to resist
ossification of their personalities by creating art on their own. More critically, we would be building a democracy of
people who do, rather than people who sample.”); FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION ®,
http://www.freedomofexpression.us/trademark.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) (featuring Kembrew McLeod’s
explanation of how he trademarked the expression “Freedom of Expression:”
In my application to the Patent and Trademark Office, I didn’t write: “I want to
trademark ‘freedom of expression’ as an ironic comment that demonstrates how
our culture has become commodified and privately owned.” I simply applied to
register this trademark and let the government decide whether or not we should
live in a world where someone can legally control freedom of expression®. In
filing this application, I crossed the enemy line at the Patent and Trademark
Office, feigning allegiance by speaking their slippery language of legalese,
fooling them into saying what I hoped wasn’t actually possible.).
Joining these voices of generalized discomfort with intellectual property rights are those who feel that
fashion, in particular, benefits from the relatively low level of IP protections. While Kal Raustiala and Christopher
Sprigman do not go so far as to claim that the fashion industry would collapse “in a high-IP environment,” they do
[8]

Before turning to the three IP protections and assessing their relative in/compatibility
with the fashion industry, it is important to stress the difference between copying and
counterfeiting. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defines the verb “counterfeit” as “[t]o unlawfully
forge, copy, or imitate and item . . . or to possess such an item without authorization and with the
intent to deceive or defraud by presenting the item as genuine.”41 The dictionary notes that
“[c]ounterfeiting includes producing or selling an item that displays a reproduction of a genuine
trademark, usually to deceive buyers into thinking they are purchasing genuine merchandise.”42
Counterfeiting is criminalized by the United States Code, which provides that “[w]hoever
intentionally . . . traffics in goods or services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in
connection with such goods or services,” is fined, “if an individual, . . . not more than $2,000,000

argue that “a regime of low IP protection, by permitting extensive and free copying, enables emerging trends to
develop and diffuse rapidly, and, as a result of the positionality of fashion, to die rapidly.” Kal Raustiala &
Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L.
REV. 1687, 1733–34. Thus, Raustiala and Sprigman assert, “[m]ore fashion goods are consumed in a low-IP world
than would be consumed in a world of high IP protection precisely because copying rapidly reduces the status
premium conveyed by new apparel and accessory designs, leading status-seekers to renew the hunt for the next new
thing.” Id. at 1733. In this way, low IP protection can stimulate innovation rather than stifle it. See id. at 1688.
Ann Bartow also argues against IP protection for fashion, which “depriv[es] poor and penny-pinching people of
noncounterfeit knockoffs.” Ann Bartow, Counterfeits, Copying and Class, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 707, 747 (2011).
Bartow suggests that the alleged fear of consumer confusion is just a smokescreen for trying to use the law to avoid
“the effects of legitimate competition based on attributes such as price, quality, consumer appeal and retail
availability.” Id. at 707.
But see Blackmon, supra note 26, at 159 (expressing hope for a future offering greater IP protection to the
fashion industry and in which “fashion designers will for once be respected and recognized, like those before them,
for their creative contributions to our society.”); Whitney Potter, Comment, Intellectual Property’s Fashion Faux
Pas: A Critical Look at the Lack of Protection Afforded Apparel Design under the Current Legal Regime, 16
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 69, 89 (2011) (“The arguments against design protection have stood for too long upon too
weak a foundation. Once the underlying justifications for these arguments are explored, such as the allegedly
unbreakable link between innovation and piracy, their futility becomes apparent and their damaging effects
undeniable.”); Alexandra Manfredi, Note, Haute Copyright: Tailoring Copyright Protection to High-Profile
Fashion Designs, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 111, 152 (2012) (“Although introduction of a new intellectual
property protection may inspire an increase in anticompetitive behavior and could have some negative implications,
the benefits of this proposed provision would likely outweigh its drawbacks.”); Kevin V. Tu, Counterfeit Fashion:
The Interplay between Copyright and Trademark Law in Original Fashion Designs and Designer Knockoffs, 18
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 419, 448–49 (2010) (arguing that increased protection for fashion IP has been made
necessary by technological changes through which “designs can now be purloined and placed in competition with
the original almost instantly,” a phenomenon that disincentivizes innovation and thus threatens the forward
movement of the industry).
41
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 402 (9th ed. 2009).
42
Id. at 402–03.
[9]

or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, and, if a person other than an individual, shall be
fined not more than $5,000,000.”43 The statute also subjects repeat offenders to increased
sentences.44 There is thus considerable legal recourse for designers who are the victims of actual
counterfeiting. Less clear is what protects designers from imitation that threatens the
marketability of their designs without directly trying to mislead the market via counterfeiting.
One main source of protection for any creator who can fix their design in a tangible
medium is the United States Copyright Act.45 Copyright is a long-lived but not permanent
protection—for the typical “work created on or after January 1, 1978, [copyright] subsists from
its creation and . . . endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the
author’s death.”46 Nolo’s Plain-English Law Dictionary defines copyright as
[a] bundle of exclusive rights granted to the author of a creative
work such as book, movie, song, painting, photograph, design,
computer software, or architecture. These rights include the right
to make copies, authorize others to make copies, make derivative
works, sell and market the work, and perform the work. Any one
of these rights can be sold or licensed separately through transfers
of copyright ownership. Copyright rights are acquired
automatically once the work is fixed in a tangible medium of
expression. Registration of the work with the Copyright Office
offers additional benefits to the copyright owner.47
Among these “additional benefits” is the capacity to enforce your copyright— although
“registration is voluntary” and “[c]opyright exists from the moment the work is created[, y]ou
will have to register . . . if you wish to bring a lawsuit for infringement of a U.S. work.48
“Copyright . . . protects original works of authorship including literary, dramatic, musical, and

43

18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2013).
Id.
45
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2013).
46
17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2013).
47
NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY, http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/copyright-term.html (last visited
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artistic works, such as poetry, novels, movies, songs, computer software, and architecture.
Copyright does not protect facts, ideas, systems, or methods of operation, although it may protect
the way these things are expressed.”49 Copyright protects even unintentional copying, so “it is
sometimes said that civil copyright is a ‘strict liability’ offense.”50
Given the scope of copyright protection, fashion design—the tangible representation of a
designer’s vision—would seem to be an excellent match for this form of legal protection. In
reality, however, fashion designs are often unable to overcome the hurdles that items must clear
to secure copyright protection. Charles E. Colman ranks copyright’s anti-utility requirement as
the bar most likely to preclude copyright protection for fashion: “Because the Copyright Act
excludes ‘useful articles’ from federally copyrightable subject matter, 17 U.S.C. § 101,
clothing—‘useful’ insofar as it covers the body for reasons of warmth or social norms—
generally receives no protection under copyright law.”51 Another bar to copyright protection that
is particularly relevant to the fashion industry is the so-called “idea/expression dichotomy”: “in
the visual arts, including fashion, ‘it is not clear that there is any real distinction between the idea
in a work of art and its expression [because an] artist’s idea, among other things, is to depict a
subject in a particular way.”52 Although lobbyists are trying to change copyright law to gain
more protection for fashion design,53 copyright does not currently offer designers much recourse.
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Nor does patent law54 afford designers much in the way of protection. “Patents,
exclusively a creature of federal law, come in two varieties that are relevant [to the fashion
industry]: utility patents, which protect previously undiscovered utilitarian processes and
devices; and design patents, which protect non-functional, original, ornamental designs for
manufactured articles.”55 Utility patents protect inventions for twenty years from the date on
which the patent application is filed; design patents protect inventions for fourteen years from the
grant of the patent. 56 Both varieties of patents require fees, though utility patents are more costly
than design patents.57 It can take quite a while to obtain either kind of patent.58
The timing of patents is a major obstacle for the fast-moving fashion industry. As Oscar
Wilde once wrote, “[W]hat is a fashion? From the artistic point of view, it is usually a form of
ugliness so intolerable that we have to alter it every six months.”59 So ephemeral are fashion
trends that, in many cases, the item for which a patent were sought would be moot before the
USPTO would decide whether to grant the patent.60 Patent law also poses other hurdles that
make it a dubious match for most fashion design. For both varieties of patent,61 the invention
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must be “new and useful,”62 and demonstrate “novelty;”63 its innovation, moreover, must not
have been “obvious.”64 These requirements are a tall order for an industry of limited
possibilities; as Vera Wang has noted, “We’re dealing with the human body. You can lower the
waistline down to your kneecaps or raise it all the way up to your neck, but unless a woman
grows another leg or another arm or two heads, we’re still working within a certain structure.”65
Consequently, “[n]othing has never been done before.”66 Patent law, like copyright, is too rigid
to keep pace with the fleet and supple fashion industry.
The last of the IP triumvirate, trademark law,67 is “the most flexible, sharpest little
dagger” in the armory of the fashion lawyer.68 Trademark offers renewable protection in tenyear increments;69 “trademark protection is [thus] potentially perpetual in duration.”70 “At a
fundamental level, trademarks serve to indicate the source of goods and services,”71 with the
twofold goal of incentivizing innovation by prohibiting free riding and of preventing consumer
confusion.72 This second aim leads courts to ask, “‘[H]ow close is too close?’”73 The manner in
which a court will go about answering this question will vary, because “[e]ach federal circuit has
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developed its own ‘likelihood of confusion’ factors.”74 Thus, although grounded in federal
statute, trademark law has been shaped by the courts.
Trademarks can take many forms. Charles E. Colman’s classification includes: words;
generic marks; descriptive marks; suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks; names and personas;
full names; pictoral or design marks; sound and smell marks; color marks.75 In the next section,
we will focus on color trademarks and, more specifically, single-color trademarks. As Colman
has observed, “color is its own animal in the trademark realm[, and n]aturally color trademarks
are of particular interest to the fashion industry, where visual impact is of the utmost
importance.”76 When we later turn to the following section, which discusses the Louboutin case
itself, we will see how the Second Circuit tailored trademark law to suit fashion.
B. Single-Color Trademarks
In 1995 the Supreme Court asked “whether the [Lanham Act] permits the registration of a
trademark that consists, purely and simply of a color.”77 Qualitex Company, a manufacturer of
dry-cleaning press pads, had decked its pads in “a special shade of green-gold” for nearly forty
years when rival Jacobson Products began to sell its own pads, “color[ing] those pads in a similar
green gold.”78 Would trademark law allow Qualitex to prevent Jacobson from using the color?
The Court began to answer this question by looking to the language of the Lanham Act
and finding no indication that color is excluded from “the universe of things that can qualify as a
74
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trademark.”79 Perusing the roster of registered marks, the Court found startling heterogeneity
and asked: “If a shape, a sound, and a fragrance can act as symbols why . . . can a color not do
the same?”80 Although color is “unlike ‘fanciful,’ ‘arbitrary,’ or ‘suggestive’ words or designs,
which almost automatically tell a customer that they refer to a brand,”81 the Court observed, a
color can nevertheless “come to signify and distinguish the goods [it is used to mark] . . . much
in the way that descriptive words on a product . . . can come to indicate a products origin.”82
Noting that “[i]t is the source-distinguishing ability of a mark—not its ontological status as color,
shape, fragrance, word or sign—that permits it to serve [the] basic purposes [of trademark
law],”83 the Court found no “reason to disqualify absolutely the use of color as a mark.”84
Finding no absolute bar to using color as a mark does not lead inexorably to upholding a
single-color trademark, however. Notably, the would-be color mark needs (1) to have “attained
‘secondary meaning’”85 and (2) to not have a function upon which competition is based.86 Thus,
the Court “conclude[d,] . . . sometimes, a color will meet ordinary legal trademark requirements.
And, when it does so, no special legal rule prevents color alone from serving as a trademark.”87
Applying its test to the Qualitex pads, the Court found the color to be a valid mark:
The green-gold color acts as a symbol. Having developed
secondary meaning (for customers identified the green-gold color
as Qualitex’s), it identifies the pads’ source. And, the green-gold
color serves no other function. (Although it is important to use
some color on the press pads to avoid noticeable stains, the
[district] court found no competitive need in the press pad industry
for the green-gold color, since other colors are equally usable).88
79
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This two-part test for single-color trademarks remains good law.89
The first prong, “secondary meaning,” is difficult to satisfy on a practical level—it
requires time and effort to build referentiality—but simple in theory—whether that meaning has
been created is an empirical question, at least for color-based trademarks.90 To determine
whether a mark has attained secondary, or source-identifying meaning, “certain evidentiary
factors are appropriate to consider: (1) the length and manner of its use, (2) the nature and extent
of advertising and promotion of the mark, and (3) the efforts made to promote a conscious
connection, in the public’s mind, between that mark and a single source.”91 This is a factintensive inquiry, and the weight given to particular facts will vary from industry to industry.92
Whereas the existence of secondary meaning is fairly straightforward, the second prong
of the Qualitex test poses quite a theoretical conundrum—what does “functional” mean? The
green-gold of the Qualitex pads served to mask stains but was not “functional” because other
colors could serve the same purpose.93 Because the green-gold was not functional, it could be
protected.94 Now, suppose the green-gold was used on a hunting jacket. In this context, the
same color could not be protected because it would function to camouflage the hunter. To grant
one producer an exclusive right to that color would be tantamount to granting that producer a
monopoly on hunting-jackets—competitors would be forced to use non-camouflaging colors, a
major disadvantage.95 “The functionality doctrine . . . forbids the use of a product’s feature as a
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trademark where doing so will put a competitor at a significant disadvantage because the feature
is essential to the use or purpose of the article or affects its cost or quality.”96
But what happens in a field like fashion, where competition turns not on the actual
function of the items offered—most shirts, for example, will cover the body and provide shirtlevel warmth—but on their aesthetic appeal? This problem was envisioned back in 1938:
The trademark law doctrine of “aesthetic functionality” has a . . .
humble origin . . . —the blandly named “Comment a” in § 742 of
the Restatement of Torts, which explained: “When goods are
bought largely for their aesthetic value, their features may be
functional because they definitely contribute to that value and thus
aid the performance of an object for which the goods are
intended.” From this seed grew the gnarled tree now known as
“aesthetic functionality.”97
As presented in this form, aesthetic functionality does not seem so complicated: in markets in
which competition stems not from actual functionality, but rather from aesthetics, than the
aesthetic value of an object essentially becomes part of that object’s function. As a result,
trademark protection would not extend to features that contribute to the item’s aesthetic appeal.
In Qualitex, however, the Supreme Court reformulated the doctrine of aesthetic functionality:
[I]f a design’s “aesthetic value” lies in its ability to “confe[r] a
significant benefit that cannot be duplicated by the use of
alternative designs,” then the design is “functional.” The “ultimate
test of aesthetic functionality, [therefore,] . . . is whether the
recognition of trademark rights would significantly hinder
competition.98
This formulation is both more obscure and, potentially, more supple than the original version of
the doctrine. Whereas the original first asks whether the item is purchased for its aesthetics or its
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function (such that dry cleaning pads, bought for their function, survive the test, but fashionable
items, bought for their attractiveness, might not), the Qualitex version first asks whether the
item’s appearance creates a significant benefit. Thus, if it is the green-gold of the Qualitex dry
cleaning pads that served to make them desirable, then the green-gold would not be protectable.
No one would accuse the Qualitex test for aesthetic functionality of being easy to apply.
Indeed, “[t]he status of the aesthetic functionality doctrine is not clear,” and the circuits have not
applied this doctrine in the same way.99 As we turn now to the Louboutin saga, we will see how
the Second Circuit approaches the question of functionality and whether colors can ever be
anything other than functional in a field in which appearance is everything.
III. Louboutin’s Red Soles
Louboutin painted his first sole red in 1992.100 As Lauren Collins tells the story,
Louboutin had thought of making a shoe inspired by Andy
Warhol’s “Flowers.” The prototype, a pink stacked heel with a
cartoonish cloth blossom, had arrived from Italy. “I was very
happy, because it was similar to the drawing,” Louboutin recalled,
“but the drawing still was stronger and I could not understand
why.” Louboutin continued, “There was this big black sole, and
then, thank God, there was this girl painting her nails at the time.”
Louboutin grabbed the nail polish—it was red—from the assistant
and slathered it on the sole of the prototype. “Then it popped,” he
recalled, “and I thought, This is the drawing!”101
Louboutin has colored his soles red ever since that fateful day. The red soles no longer serve to
evoke Warhol; rather, they have taken on their own meaning: “I selected the color because it is
engaging, flirtatious, memorable, and the color of passion,” Louboutin has affirmed.102 In
addition to their seductive virtues, the red soles are clever from a business perspective: “Part of
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the genius of the red sole is that it is beautiful. The other part is that it requires a lot of
refreshing: Louboutins, which look horrible scuffed, start to depreciate the day you walk them
off the lot.”103 Yet, though he acknowledges red’s connation of passion, and though the fragility
of the colored sole keeps customers coming in for refreshments and replacements at a lucrative
clip, Louboutin also asserts that “[t]he shiny red color of the soles has no function other than to
identify to the public that they are mine.”104 Accordingly, Louboutin argued, his red soles are a
valid mark upon which Yves Saint Laurent (“YSL”) infringed when it released an all-red shoe.105
Judge Marrero, in an opinion for which he is likely to be infamous for some time,106
relied on the somewhat enigmatic doctrine of aesthetic functionality to hold that the expressive
potential inherent in the red sole trumped its secondary meaning (“these are Louboutins”):
Because in the fashion industry color serves ornamental and
aesthetic functions vital to robust competition, the Court finds that
Louboutin is unlikely to be able to prove that its red outsole brand
is entitled to trademark protection, even if it has gained enough
public recognition in the market to acquire secondary meaning.107
While the Supreme Court did uphold a single-color marks in Qualitex,108 Marrero notes,
“whatever commercial purposes may support extending trademark protection to a single color for
industrial goods do not easily fit the unique characteristics and needs . . . that define production
103
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of articles of fashion.”109 To Marrero, the difference between the industries makes them
incomparable—after all, “industrial models [do not] sashay[] down the runways in displays of
the designs and shades of the season’s collections of wall insulation.”110
Marrero argues that fashion is more appropriately analogized to painting, “[b]ecause both
find common ground and goals in two vital fields of human endeavor, art and commerce.”111 In
both domains, “the whole spectrum of light serves as a primal ingredient without which neither
painting nor fashion design as expressive and ornamental art would flourish.”112 Just as we
would not want Picasso to be able to preclude Monet from painting water the same shade of blue
that Picasso used,113 Marrero reasons, trademark “law should not countenance restraints that
would interfere with creativity and stifle competition by one designer, while granting another a
monopoly invested with the right to exclude use of an ornamental or functional medium
necessary for freest and most productive artistic expression by all engaged in the same
enterprise.”114 This is precisely what upholding the red sole mark would produce, Marrero fears:
[A]t any moment when the market and the deities of design, by
whatever fancy the decide those things, proclaim that “passion” is
in for a given season and must be expressed in reds in the year’s
various collections, Louboutin’s claim would cast a red cloud over
the whole industry, cramping what other designers could do, while
allowing Louboutin to paint with a full palette.115
Accordingly, Judge Marrero denied Louboutin’s request for an injunction.116
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Judge Marrero did correctly perceive that Louboutin’s registration certificate was
overbroad: it claimed the lacquered red sole as a trademark when placed on “women’s high
fashion designer footwear.”117 A trademark of such vague contours would take many shades of
red off the sole market for anything that could be argued to be “high fashion designer
footwear.”118 Both the Second Circuit, as we will see below, and the Cour de cassation, France’s
highest court, agree that, as described in his registration certificate, Louboutin’s mark is
overbroad.119 In what is perhaps a case of jurisprudence imitating art, however, Judge Marrero
framed the question he was addressing much more broadly than he should have, such that his
decision ended created per se rule against single-color trademarks in fashion:
The narrow120 question presented here is whether the Lanham Act
extends protection to a trademark composed of a single color used
many of the things she sees are artifacts created by others. That a first creator
has labored is not sufficient ground to justify giving her a right to keep others
from achieving their proper goals.
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as an expressive and defining quality of an article of wear
produced in the fashion industry. In other words, the Court must
decide whether there is something unique about the fashion world
that militates against extending trademark protection to a single
color, although such registrations have sometimes been upheld in
other industries.121
This sweeping question led to an equally sweeping YES: “the Court cannot conceive that the
Lanham Act could serve as the source of the broad spectrum of absurdities that would follow
recognition of a trademark for the use of a single color for fashion items.”122 Thus, encapsulated
in Judge Marrero’s decision is an argument for excluding fashion from the trademark protection
that other industries enjoy, even though it cannot secure the copyright protection from which
other, less “useful” artistic media, benefit.123 Through his focus on the functional potential of
appealing elements, moreover, Judge Marrero brought the difficult doctrine of aesthetic
functionality to the Second Circuit’s door.124
The Second Circuit did not leave the fashion industry betwixt and between. Rather, it
reined in the scope of the issue and of Louboutin’s trademark. Although the circuit court did not
engage in the sort of cultural critique the district court practiced, it did nevertheless contribute to
culture by taking action—the Second Circuit took its blue pencil to Louboutin’s red soles and
defined them in a way that makes them both protectable and more meaningful.
The Second Circuit took a methodical approach from the outset:
We address the District Court’s order in three parts. We first
consider whether a single color is protectable as a trademark, both
generally and in the specific context of the fashion industry. We
then address the doctrine of “aesthetic functionality” and consider
whether, as the District Court held, a single-color mark is
necessarily “functional” in the context of the fashion industry—
with the result that no such mark could ever be trademarked in that
121
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industry. Finally, we determine whether the Red Sole Mark is a
valid trademark entitled to the protection of the Lanham Act.125
In answering the first question, the Second Circuit stressed the consumer-protective purpose of
trademark law and noted that, although this protection has the benefit of entailing protection of
for the producer, “it is not intended to protect innovation by giving the innovator a monopoly
over a useful product feature.”126 The Second Circuit stressed that “[s]uch a monopoly is the
realm of patent law or copyright law, which seek to encourage innovation, and not of trademark
law, which seeks to preserve a vigorously competitive market for the benefit of consumers.”127
Despite this caveat, the court noted, a mark merits protection if it is distinctive, either
inherently or by having acquired secondary meaning.128 When a mark is distinctive, it is
enforceable against those competitors whose products feature marks so similar that thy might
create consumer confusion—unless, that is, the competitor can show that the mark is functional
on either a utilitarian or an aesthetic level.129 The Second Circuit described “the test for aesthetic
functionality [as] threefold: At the start, we . . . ask[] whether [(1)] the design feature is either
essential to the use or purpose or [(2)] affects the cost or quality of the product at issue.”130 If the
answer to either of these is “yes,” then the inquiry ends and trademark protection is denied. If,
on the other hand, the answer to both is “no,” then (3) the mark must still “be shown not to have
a significant effect on competition in order to receive trademark protection.”131
Having set forth the contours of the usual test for trademark validity and the affirmative
defense of aesthetic functionality, the Second Circuit turned to the question of whether there was
125
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anything special about the use of single-color trademarks in the fashion industry that would
require modifying the test. Noting that the test for aesthetic functionality is necessarily factintensive132 and that “the Supreme Court specifically forbade the implementation of a per se rule
that would deny protection for the use of a single color as a trademark in a particular industrial
context,”133 the Second Circuit “determined that no per se rule governs the protection of singlecolor marks in the fashion industry, any more than it can do so in any other industry.”134
Accordingly, the Second Circuit began its analysis of Louboutin’s trademark case by
asking whether the red sole was distinctive enough to merit protection. The court observed that
“a single color, standing alone, can almost never be inherently distinctive,”135 but found that the
red soles to be distinctive by virtue of the secondary meaning they have acquired: “Louboutin’s
marketing efforts have created [a]brand with worldwide recognition. . . . By placing the color
red in a context that seems unusual and deliberately tying that color to his product, Louboutin
has created an identifying mark firmly associated with his brand which, to those in the know,
instantly denotes his shoes’ source.”136 The Second Circuit noted, however, that Louboutin’s red
soles only carry secondary meaning in certain circumstances:
We conclude, based upon the record before us, that Louboutin has
not established secondary meaning in an application of a red sole
to a red shoe, but only where the red sole contrasts with the
“upper” of the shoe. The use of a red lacquer on the outsole of a
red shoe of the same color is not a use of the Red Sole Mark.137
The Second Circuit therefore rewrote Louboutin’s trademark in keeping with the contrast the
court found to be a central element of his soles’ significance: “We . . . instruct the Director of
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the Patent and Trade Office to limit the registration of the Red Sole Mark to only those situations
in which the red lacquered outsole contrasts in color with the adjoining ‘upper’ of the shoe.”138
The Second Circuit’s decision was win-win for the parties involved: Louboutin’s red
sole mark is protected, and Saint Laurent’s monochromatic red shoe marches forward.139 The
fashion industry also won big: although it remains unclear how the circuit will address questions
of functionality in aesthetic elements going forward, it is now evident that aesthetic trademarks
in fashion will at least get the benefit of a fact-intensive inquiry into their validity. Susan Scafidi
applauded the Second Circuit’s decision, celebrating the fact that “the district court’s
overreaching attempt to ban all single-color trademarks in fashion was tossed out like a bad
impulse purchase. One small sigh of relief for a man, one giant sigh of relief for the fashion
community. Now we can all put up our red soles and rest.”140
The biggest victory in the Second Circuit’s decision was arguably the court’s
modification of Louboutin’s trademark. This is, first and foremost, a triumph of common sense:
the circuit court could simply have invalidated the mark for overbreadth as the Cour de cassation
did in Louboutin’s Hexagon-based battle,141 a harsh result that would ill reward the effort
Louboutin has expended in promoting his brand through his red sole mark.142 The modification
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is also important because, by defining the soles as deriving meaning through contrast, the Second
Circuit made contrast an element of the red sole mark. Contrast may always have made the mark
stand out, but making it an explicit feature of the mark is significant: like a filter in a search
engine, this additional definitional element makes the red soles easier to identify—and to invoke.
The next section focuses on why increased invocative potential is a win for culture in general.
IV. Analysis
Karl Lagerfeld once said that “[f]ashion is a language that creates itself in clothes to
interpret reality.”143 Design elements and garments are like letters and words, and it is perhaps
easier to understand the perils and potential of trademark protection in the fashion world through
this fashion-as-language concept. If the fashion industry is a conversation between designers and
consumers, the goal—regardless of whose philosophy of property and society we apply—is to
encourage the discussion to range over many topics and to include as many voices as possible.
The question is thus whether protection such as Louboutin’s trademark stimulates the
conversation or stifles it. Did the Second Circuit’s decision partially gag designers who might
choose to express themselves via red soles, by taking away something akin to the letter “O,” like
James Thurber’s pirates?144 This note argues that, while the Second Circuit certainly did take an

red outsoles, the court sends a clear message to designers: if you want to preserve your right to use similar elements,
do not let secondary meaning build unchecked. Jeffrey J. Look has warned that this need for vigilance has been
made more acute for secondary meaning that can be built via the internet:
The creators of copyrightable works, as well as trademark owners, will need to
exercise vigilance in patrolling the Internet for infringers and will need to act
quickly to stop the activity. If not, they risk losing their right to control the
manner by which their intellectual works are distributed, used and displayed.
This is not unlike the real property concept of adverse possession.
Jeffrey J. Look, The Virtual Wild, Wild West (Www): Intellectual Property Issues in Cyberspace: Trademarks,
Service Marks, Copyrights, and Domain Names, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 49, 89 (1999).
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‘They will take my gold,’ moaned the goldsmith. ‘And my forge,’ sighed the blacksmith. ‘And my cloth,’ wept the
tailor. ‘And my chocolate,’ muttered the candymaker.” Id. at 17. The key difference between the villagers in the
story and the other designers who may no longer use red lacquered soles on their high-fashion women’s shoes is that
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expressive option off the table, as if it had removed a tile from the Scrabble board of fashion,145
it framed its decision in such a way as to create third level of meaning—“tertiary meaning,” or
the meaning that can be attached to a brand name, such as the safety that many suburbanites
equate with Volvos146—to join the secondary meaning that secured Louboutin’s red sole mark.
This tertiary meaning can come from without—when other designers refer to and reframe
the protected design—as well as from within, when companies adopt social aims so that their
brand markers signify these goals as well. Thus, although upholding Louboutin’s mark protected
his ability to benefit from his maker’s rights in a Lockean sense147 and the artistic expression of
his person in a Hegelian sense,148 the increased potential for communication through tertiary
meaning maximizes—via a spillover effect identified by Brett M. Frischmann and Mark A.
Lemley149—both Benthamian utility150 (by multiplying available choices and thus allowing
participants to compare options and make selections offering the most favorable pleasure-to-pain
ratio) and Aristotelian human flourishing151 (by multiplying available choices and thus allowing
participants to develop “autonomy, practical reason, and sociability”). This is the very sort of

designers will be able to play with the idea of the contrasting sole (as in by soles of other colors) and the contrasting
use of red (as in the red underside of a handbag), and these design elements will have additional meaning by dint of
referencing Louboutin’s red sole mark.
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balanced solution that Wendy J. Gordon advocates as a means to protect the creator from
“stowaways” while still adhering to the Lockean proviso of “enough and as good.”152
It is nothing new to suggest that the clothes and accessories in which we dress ourselves
have the ability to communicate. In fact, it is precisely because such choices are meaningful that
people are able to make what are commonly called “fashion statements.” In making a fashion
statement, however, it is the wearers of clothes who have chosen both the message and the means
of communicating that message, not the fashion designers.153 Roland Barthes similarly
emphasized the split that exists between a tangible fashion item and the message attributed to it.
He noted that every piece of clothing featured in a magazine is actually three garments:
The first is the one presented to me as photographed or drawn—it
is image-clothing. The second is the same garment, but described,
transformed into language; this same dress, photographed on the
right, becomes on the left: a leather belt, with a rose stuck in it,
worn above the waist, on a soft Shetland dress; this is a written
garment. . . . [T]hese two garments recover a single identity at the
level of the real garment they are supposed to represent.154
Thus, the inherent “semiotic nature” of fashion design—that is, of the “real garment” in
Barthes’s analysis—is expanded and accentuated by the photographic and verbal representations
of the garment, such that “[f]ashion becomes narrative.”155 It is important to note that, in
Barthes’s conception of how fashion acquires meaning, there must first be translation—the
intermediary known as a “shifter,” to use Barthes’s term—among these three garments.156
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C. Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk focus on the manner in which designers communicate
through the fashions they create, arguing that “[i]nnovation in fashion creates vocabularies for
self-expression that relate individuals to social worlds.”157 They note that, “[a]s a means of
signaling and communicating about oneself, and of perceiving messages about others, dress has a
symbolic function and is even considered by some social theorist to be a code or a language that
provides visual cues and signifiers of identity, personality, values, or other social meanings.”158
Hemphill and Suk assert that this communicative, quasi-linguistic capacity of fashion design
frequently leads designers to communicate by “remixing”159 statements made by their creative
peers and predecessors. Citing Chanel jackets and quilted purses as designs to which designers
frequently allude, Hemphill and Suk liken such referencing to forms of musical allusion,
“homage and pastiche.”160 They assert that
designers . . . may engage in interpretation or ‘referencing.’ They
may quote, comment upon, and refer to prior work. Unlike much
close copying, such interpretation does not pass off the work as the
work that is being copied. Instead, it marks awareness of the
difference between the two works as it looks to the prior work as a
source of influence, or even a precursor. Even where the influence is
not completely conscious or direct, the latter work draws on the
meaning of the earlier work, rather than being simply a copy of it.161
Hemphill and Suk clearly support creative remixing as an outlet of expression, a means of
imparting meaning, and even a process that can drive fashion forward.162
Hemphill and Suk thus argue that design elements can take on the same role in shaping
the language of fashion that verbal trademarks hold with respect to language itself. One of the
157
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most common marks is the single word (e.g. Fendi®, Armani®, Crocs®).163 Single-word
trademarks have proven quite adept at capturing the public interest and infiltrating daily speech.
Once they enter the idiom, trademarked words both submit to and spark metamorphoses—they
are converted into various forms of speech at the whim of the speaker, on the one hand, and they
oust older yet perfectly serviceable words on the other, changing the linguistic landscape forever.
Recognizing the linguistic importance of trademarks, Professor Laura A. Heymann notes that:
We use “Coke” to refer to the Coca-Cola beverage in the North,
and “coke” to refer to any kind of soda in the South, yet we still
manage to get the drinks we desire. We use trademarks as verbs—
we “xerox” a document or “tivo” a television program—without
losing sight of the fact that “Xerox” and “TiVo” are brands of
particular products. We use trademarks as metaphor and as slang—
“Kleenex,” for example, has been used as street language for
ecstasy. . . .164
Indeed, single-word marks are so common and can exert such strong effects on language that one
can forget they are trademarks (e.g. jet ski, bubble wrap, onesies).165 In we might call linguistic
Darwinism, brand names sometimes prove stronger and survive longer than generic terms.
Although Hemphill and Suk encourage design Darwinism through reference and
preference, they are careful to distinguish referencing from copying,166 which they say “threatens
163
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the amount of innovation and pulls the direction of innovation toward fashion’s status conferral
aspects an away from its expressive agents.”167 Of course, the line between clever allusion and
copy is not necessarily a bright one. Notably, remixers and their “mixees” may disagree on
whether a reference constitutes a knowing wink or a theft:168 fashion designers may be as
willing as any to take their place on the shoulders of giants,169 but the giants do not always want
them there, nor do fashion critics. After a show by Marc Jacobs, for example, one critic
lamented his “remixing” of other designers:
Most disappointing was that Jacobs spent a significant amount of
time merely repeating or paraphrasing what designers such as
Kawakubo, Margiela and the Dutch team of Viktor & Rolf have
already said aesthetically. . . . Jacobs’s greatest gift is his unique
voice, his ability to create clothes that rise out of his interest in
popular culture—from animation to music. This collection seemed
to emerge from the pages of other designers’ old sketchbooks.170
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Clearly, to Robin Givhan, design elements should not be referenced like elements of pop culture.
Although this seems like a strange—and strained—line to draw when the fashion industry thrives
on its popularity, it is not an uncommon sentiment.
[T]he bashing Jacobs took this season only proves that the critics’
love-hate relationship with derivation is an ever[-]swinging
pendulum. A designer may be lauded for appropriating one
season—as happened when Jacobs’s Yves Saint Laurent/Walter
Albini–inspired fall 2007 collection was nearly universally
praised—and castigated the next. Over the years, many major
designers have been so chided. Calvin Klein was at various times
chastised for leaning toward Giorgio Armani and Helmut Lang; a
retailer even termed his fall 1998 show “Comme des Calvin” for
its strong Japanese motifs. Klein’s successor, Francisco Costa, has
taken shots as well, most recently in spring 2007 for a stunning
resemblance to Lang.171
While many voices in fashion do not distinguish—at least systematically and
predictably—between referencing and copying, some designers do support “quoting” the work of
others. Tom Ford, “often accused of seeing the world through Halston-colored glasses, [has]
remarked, ‘Nothing made me happier than to see something that I had done copied.…
Appropriation has always been a trend.’”172 Derek Lam, after being criticized for copying,
admitted the reference and expressed regret that no one understand what he was trying to do
through that reference: “‘Definitely, I was looking at Alaïa,’ he says. . . . ‘[T]he message I was
proposing didn’t come across clearly enough.’ As for what tipped the balance from inspiration to
perceived plagiarism, Lam wonders if he should have provided show notes.”173
It seems that Derek Lam was trying to live the dream of self-conscious referencing that
Hemphill and Suk favor. For Lam, that dream turned into a publicity nightmare. If the designs
he was quoting were protected as intellectual property, however, Lam would have had an easy
171
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answer: he would either have crossed the line and infringed, or walked the line and imbued his
work with the meaning derived from the designs he referenced. It is the ambiguity of the
signified designs’ status that left Lam vulnerable to criticism.174
The Second Circuit’s Louboutin decision offers such clarity to those who would like to
refer to his work. In upholding the red-sole trademark and, especially, in defining it with the
precision it originally lacked, the Second Circuit made the scope of Louboutin’s message very
clear. Because the contrasting red lacquered sole is Louboutin’s, those designers who wish to
incorporate statements about Louboutin into their works can do so without fear that their designs
will be interpreted as unoriginal rather than deliberately referential.175 This referentiality is a
third layer of meaning: if the provocativeness Louboutin sought to capture is the primary
meaning of his soles, and the fact that the soles say “Louboutin” is their secondary meaning,
references to Louboutin’s soles would allow designers to graft tertiary meaning upon those
soles.176 While designers may no longer be able to legally create high-heeled women’s pumps
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with contrasting red soles, in other words, they have gained the ability to add their own gloss to
the meaning of “Louboutin” by evoking the soles in meaning-rich ways in their designs.177
Literature gives us some examples of the kinds of meanings that can be implicitly
attached to brand markers. The potential for the creation of multiple levels of meaning via
design protection was already apparent in 1883, when Émile Zola fictionalized the creation of
the first department store in Paris and offered a very perceptive account of the massive
commercial and social impact of the grands-magazins. Zola’s Au Bonheur des dames begins
with a long, detailed description of the spell-binding power that the window displays of the new
retail colossus exert upon the novel’s heroine, Denise, and her family. After several pages of
adjective-laden accounts of the diverse wares on offer, Denise arrives at the final display:
A display of silks, satins, and velvets spread out before them in a supple,
shimmering range of the most delicate flower tones: at the top were the
velvets, of deepest black and as white as curds; lower down were the
satins, pink and blue, with bright folds fading into infinitely tender
pallors; lower down still were the silks, all the colours of the rainbow,
pieces rolled into shell shapes, folded as if round a drawn-in waist,
brought to life by the knowing hands of the shop assistants; and,
between each motif, between each coloured phrase of the display, there
ran a discreet accompaniment, a delicate gathered strand of creamcoloured foulard. And in colossal piles at each end were the two silks
for which the shop held exclusive rights, the Paris-Paradise and the Cuird’Or, exceptional items that were to revolutionize the drapery trade.178
The fabrics mentioned at the end are the only proprietary names in Zola’s long catalog of
available goods and, after mentioning these names, the lyrical lèche-vitrines179 ends and the
action of the story begins. Just as the explicit meaning of Zola’s text foreshadows the revolution
that material. See Colman, Overview of IP issues, supra note 38, at *12; Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even
More Parodic than the Real Thing: Parody Lawsuits Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 1000–08 (2004).
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But see Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,
111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 677 (1998) (arguing that excessive property rights can lead to the underuse of resources that
occurs when access to them is blocked by property rights and that “[a] tragedy of the anticommons can occur when
too many individuals have rights of exclusion in a scarce resource”).
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The English expression “window shopping” is a poor substitute for the French “window licking,” with its
connotations of appetite, need, desire and Pavlovian response.
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produced by the proprietary fabrics, IP functions as both an end and a beginning in within the
prose of the novel. By placing protected fabrics at the transition point between charming but
relatively static description and action-packed, verb-driven narration, Zola symbolically captures
both the loss of communicative possibilities that those who argue against IP protection lament
and IP’s ability to drive industry forward that those who advocate IP protection celebrate.180
Flashing forward six score years, we come to Sophie Kinsella’s best-selling Shopaholic
series, an ode to brand-worship. Kinsella’s works depict even more directly the communicative
potential of branding. In the book that launched the series, the eponymous shopping addict,
Becky Bloomwood, walks through London on her way to work and reflects on her outfit:
I’m wearing my black skirt from French Connection, and a plain
white T-shirt from Knickerbox, and a little angora cardigan which
I got from M&S but looks like it might be Agnès b. And my new
square-toed shoes from Hobbs. Even better, although no one can
see them, I know that underneath I’m wearing my gorgeous new
matching knickers and bra with embroidered yellow rosebuds.
They’re the best bit of my entire outfit. In fact, I almost wish I
could be run over so that the world would see them.
It’s a habit of mine, itemizing all the clothes I’m
wearing . . . . I’ve been doing it for years—ever since I used to read
Just Seventeen. Every issue, they’d stop a girl on the street, take a
picture of her, and list all her clothes. . . . I used to read those lists
avidly, and to this day, if I buy something from a shop that’s a bit
uncool, I cut the label out. So that if I’m ever stopped in the street,
I can pretend I don’t know where it’s from.181
In this text, brands stand as unqualified nouns and add their own meaning to Becky’s outfit. We
have no idea what Becky’s skirt looks like—is it long or short? Straight or pleated? Ruffled?
Sequined? Feathered? Wool? Cotton? Linen? Such visual minutia cannot compete with the
skirt’s brand affiliation, because it is the brand—not the look—that signifies coolness or lack
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thereof. The first meaning of the skirt is whatever aesthetic it conveys; the second is its function
as a brand identifier; the third meaning, which derives from the second, is “coolness.” Here, the
author achieves descriptive economy by underscoring the capacity of brands to serve as signs.
Literary works are able to build meaning upon fashion brand names by changing the
medium in which they occur, by exploiting the shift that must occur between real garment and
written garment, to use Barthes’s terms, to attach an extra layer of significance to the brand.
Designers can accomplish similar statements but must in some way tweak the proprietary design
to do so because they operate within the same medium as the original. One clever young
designer has found a way to quote Louboutin’s soles without simply copying them. In 2010, a
high-school student completed a school project that soon became a business: she creates colored
stickers that can be affixed to the soles of shoes.182 Although red was the first color offered by
Rosso Solini, “[t]he product range . . . has now expanded to include over 30 colours and designs
including a new bridal range.”183 Her stick-on soles are meaning-rich through their
referentiality. On their own, the stickers may connote only whim or a desire to adorn; by
evoking Louboutin the stickers take on an aspirational quality, yet also unmistakably suggest that
fancy soles are not only for the affluent. Rosso Solini is thus an outstanding example of tertiary
meaning created through reference to a protected design element.184
It is culturally fruitful to add another potential layer of meaning to design and to
encourage designers to both create and comment, such that the conversation of fashion becomes

ROSSO SOLINI, supra note 13. Founder Tara Haughton, seventeen, “has . . . won the Enterprise Award, The
Kildare Enterprise award[,] the Ulster Bank Business [Achiever]’s Award[,] and the Sean Lemass Enterprise
[A]ward.” Id.
183
Id.
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Another example is the Thursday Friday bags—open, canvas sacs bearing pictures of expensive pocketbooks.
See Thursday Friday, http://www.thufri.com/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). Unfortunately, not everyone appreciates the
statement these bags make; see also infra app. at Figure 8. See Hermès Sues Thursday Friday for Using Birkin Bag
Image, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2011, 4:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/31/hermes-suesthursday-frid_n_816613.html (“This just in: Hermès has no sense of humor.”).
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more far-reaching and self-reflexive,185 but Professor Frank Pasquale has identified a different,
and more important potential social function for intellectual property. Although expressivity is a
lovely thing, it is a luxury. But designers whose work is protected have the ability to attach less
luxurious, more socially imperative meanings to their own works:
Following the types of ‘green certifications’ offered for
development projects in [less developed countries], perhaps
the Copyright Office could condition design protection on
applicants’ contractors’ meeting certain fair labor standards
and practices. A symbol for protected designs could then
reflect a verified judgment that the designer’s licensee
respects certain wage and labor standards. IP protections
could be combined and leveraged to reflect the social
values of those concerned about the exploitation of the
poor, just as they now reflect the social values of those
concerned about the exploitation of the copied.186
If Louboutin subscribed to this view, he could make his red sole a symbol for ethical production
as well as status. While there is nothing to indicate that he holds such aims, other luxury
designers have striven to make their brands socially meaningful.187 IP protections can thus serve
social causes while simultaneously protecting brands.
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Professor Pasquale’s suggestion could help combat animal cruelty in addition to
sweatshop conditions and the systemic exploitation of laborers. Uggs, for example, are as
imitated as they are popular. They are made of shearling. “Shearling, a lambskin or sheepskin
pelt . . . is considered by some to be a separate category [from exotic furs].”188 Because
authentic Uggs are expensive, cheap copies have flooded the market.189 Many of the imitations
do use fur—fur from raccoon dogs.190 In China, these dogs are skinned alive and then tossed
onto heaps—still alive—to live out the final agonizing hours of their lives with no skin.191 The
boots made from these animals cost a mere fraction of what authentic Uggs do.192 With better
intellectual property protection for designs, it may be possible to halt this brutal shadow

world/sustainability/company-statement/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2013). When one sees her products, one knows that
they were produced in sustainable ways and that they do not contain animal skins or furs. See id. Seeing the
signature chains with which she trims her bags, for example, the first meaning is whatever style the bags convey, the
second is that the bag is a Stella McCartney bag, the third is that the bag is not made of leather and was made using
environmentally innocuous methods. See STELLA MCCARTNEY, http://www.stellamccartney.com/us/stellamccartney/women/bags/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2013); infra app. at Figure 9. This chain of logic is possible only if
Stella McCartney’s signature design elements can be protected.
188
Patrick Range McDonald, West Hollywood’s New Fur Ban Could Be a Model for the Nation. But Opponents Are
Still Trying to Strike It Down, L.A. WEEKLY, July 26, 2012, http://www.laweekly.com/2012-07-26/news/westhollywood-fur-ban-boutique-designer-peta-shearling/. “‘Shearling’ is not sheared wool. A shearling is a yearling
sheep who has been shorn once. A shearling garment is made from the skin and coat of a sheep or a lamb who was
shorn shortly before slaughter; the skin is tanned with the wool still on it.” PETA,
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meat, not just for its coat. See, e.g., Eric Wilson, Fuzzy Logic, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2009)
http://runway.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/20/fuzzy-logic/ (explaining that shearling is considered akin to leather
rather than to fur even by PETA).
189
See, e.g., Linda Mora Lee, Top 5 Fake UGGs Websites: Were [sic] to Find the Best Knock Offs, YAHOO! VOICES
(Dec. 10, 2009), http://voices.yahoo.com/top-5-fake-uggs-websites-were-find-best-knock-5041108.html. This
citation is not to suggest that the products featured on this site are among those fakes that use raccoon dog fur—I
have no idea which fakes use the fur and which do not.
190
See Lydia Warren & Oliver Pickup, Skinned Alive to Make Fake Uggs: Horrific Footage Reveals Slow,
Sickening Death of Raccoon Dogs, MailOnline (Oct. 12, 2011, 9:59 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2045016/Raccoon-dogs-skinned-alive-make-cheap-copies-Ugg-boots.html. For a description and images of the
raccoon dog, see infra app. at Figure 10.
191
See id.
192
See Caroline Grant, Uggly Truth: Video Shows Raccoon Dogs Being Flayed Alive for the Fur on Fake Trendy
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industry.193 Through marketing, Uggs could equate its brand with the humane harvesting of
skins, such that aspiring customers would not only want the look, but also the philosophy.194
When cultivated to connote social policy—be it labor standards, the humane treatment of
animals, sustainable production methods, or a company practice of charitable giving—IP law has
the capacity to give consumers the security of knowing that they are purchasing brands that stand
for values in which they believe.195 This is part of what Madhavi Sunder brilliantly labels the
New Enlightenment,196 and it would implicate the same, third level of meaning upon which
designers draw when remixing another designer’s protected creation. IP protection is a
necessary component in the production of tertiary meaning in fashion: one cannot bypass the
brand affiliation of secondary meaning to arrive at either social message or inter-designer
referentiality directly from the aesthetic connotations of the garment.197 By paving the way for
both more self-conscious artistic innovation on the one hand, and the visual promotion of social
platforms on the other, the Second Circuit’s Louboutin decision is a step in the right direction.198
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Conclusion
The Second Circuit reached the right decision in Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent from
both a legal and a philosophical perspective. Although the fashion industry largely wants for
applicable intellectual property law, at present it does have trademark and trade dress
protections. The district court improperly treated these protections as dependent on the nature of
the mark’s primary meaning—functional or functionless—rather than on whether the mark had
secondary meaning. The Second Circuit set forth a different test, one that accords more strongly
with Supreme Court precedent as well as the innovation-incentivizing goal behind IP law: if a
mark has acquired secondary meaning, then it is protectable.
By protecting Louboutin’s red sole as a single-color trademark, the Second Circuit did
foreclose the use of red soles as a contrast to the uppers of high-heeled women’s shoes by other
designers. But, to replace this mode of expression that it restricted, the Second Circuit fashioned
the possibility of imbuing the soles with tertiary meaning. The Second Circuit has defined the
red soles to mean “Louboutin,” which gives other designers the opportunity to quote the soles
and thus to comment on Louboutin, much like the creator of the Rosso Solini stick-on soles. It
simultaneously invited Louboutin to define himself, as Stella McCartney has done.
To be sure, Louboutin may decline this invitation and stick with the primary, man-bait
meaning that he originally ascribed to the soles, leaving the interpretive ground that the Second
Circuit tilled to lie fallow. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit has created fertile space in which
designers may cultivate social messages. Though less flashy than the district court opinion, the
circuit’s decision will be a wardrobe staple for designers and IP lawyers for years to come.
however, IP protections work differently in different industries. See id. at p. 4. Given the very visual nature of
fashion, its potential for communicating values outstrips that of other industries. Through IP protection, messages
can reach a larger audience, because many more people may choose to communicate through red soles or chain trim
than through the more literal Message Tee, which is suitable for only casual contexts. See infra app. at Figure 11.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1: A Rainbow of Proprietary Colors
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Figure 2: Some Louboutins Currently Available at Neiman Marcus
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Figure 3: The Louboutin Manicure & Cupcake
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Figure 4: "Poppy" and the First Red Sole

Figure 5: Wear and Tear on the Red Soles
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Figure 6 : Louboutin’s Trademark Registration
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Figure 7: Police Log from Suburbia Heights, in THE PARTY, AFTER YOU LEFT 3 (2004).
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Figure 8: The Real Birkin Bag & the Referenced Birkin Bag

Figure 9 : A Stella McCartney Bag with Chain Trim
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Figure 10: The Raccoon Dog

Figure 11: Message Tees
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